The forgotten war (1957-1958)

INTRODUCTION

This study focuses on the former Spanish colony of Ifni, with particular attention to the armed conflict that, between 1957 and 1958, pitted the Spanish army against the armed groups of the Liberation Army. These were indirectly controlled by the Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed V—until then considered an ally of Spain.

We begin with a historical overview of the origins of a stretch of land called Santa Cruz del Mar Pequeña, off the coast of Africa opposite the Canary Islands, in the 15th century. This would later become the seed of what was known as the territory of Ifni. However, the abandonment of that possession made it very difficult, in the 19th and 20th centuries, to establish its exact location. Ultimately, by a historical error, the present-day territory of Ifni was accepted as the site of the fortress of Santa Cruz del Mar Pequeña. We also make some brief considerations about the physical and geographical characteristics of the Ifni region.

The course of the Ifni War is divided here into: Background, Development (1957–58), and Consequences. We attempt to explain the reasons that led the Liberation Army’s bands to take up arms and fight against an enemy that had, until that moment, supported them in their struggle against the French colonial power. The various phases and stages of the war are reflected in the narrative of events the Franco regime tried to suppress at all costs until the conflict became impossible to hide.

It is also our intention to show the historical relations between Spain and Morocco over the centuries to the present day, and to try to understand why the bilateral relationship between Spain and Morocco has been, and remains, strained.

Finally, we mention and attempt to explain the keys to the conflict between Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic—a conflict closely linked to the Ifni War and not fully understandable without a clear grasp of what transpired in it.

On a personal note, I would like to thank Guadalupe Pérez García, author of a doctoral thesis on Ifni, for her invaluable and selfless assistance in this study.

Sidi-Ifni

SANTA CRUZ DEL MAR PEQUEÑA

During the 15th century, the crowns of Castile and Portugal were fiercely competing for control over African trade routes. After much tension and conflict, it was agreed that Castile would control the stretch from Santa Cruz de Cabo Aguer (today’s Agadir) to Cabo Bojador (later Villa Cisneros). In 1479, the Treaty of Alcáçovas recognized Portuguese dominion over Fez, Madeira, the Azores, Cape Verde, and the Guinea coast; in return, Castile was granted rights over the Canary Islands. The discovery of America led to some adjustments in the African partition, and in 1494 the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed. Castile renounced claims to the Kingdom of Fez (except Melilla) and to navigation south of Cabo Bojador. In exchange, Castile was granted the right to launch expeditions between that point and Río de Oro.

This coastal territory opposite the Canary Islands held strategic importance, bolstered by abundant fish stocks and potential trade in gold and slaves. However, establishing a foothold on the mainland required building a fortification. In 1468, King Henry IV of Castile appointed Sevillian nobleman Diego de Herrera as “Lord of the islands of Canaria and the Little Sea on the Barbary coast,” an area long known to Andalusian sailors. Herrera enriched himself with frequent raids into the continent and sought to build a permanent settlement there.

He chose Puerto Cansado, about 45 km northwest of Cabo Juby, for a fortified tower. However, due to relentless conflicts with the local Berbers, the tower was abandoned and eventually destroyed. In 1497 the adelantado Alonso Fernández de Lugo rebuilt it, and by 1499 the name Castillo de Ifni appeared for the first time—marking some tribal leaders’ submission and vassalage to the Crown of Castile. The fortress remained until another Berber attack led to its dismantling and total abandonment. Contact and interest in the area waned.

In 1859, there was renewed interest in occupying the territory, but its precise location was by then unclear, and various claims emerged. In 1860, Leopoldo O’Donnell—several times Prime Minister under Isabella II and born in the Canary Islands—considered it wise to maintain a strategic fishing outpost on the African coast once the “African War” (1850–1860) had ended. This conflict had pitted Morocco against Spain due to Moroccan attacks on Spanish African territories under the Moroccan Sultan’s tacit approval—an antecedent of the later Ifni War. The post-war treaty stipulated that:

“…His Moroccan Majesty obliges himself to grant in perpetuity to His Catholic Majesty, on the ocean coast, adjacent to Santa Cruz la Pequeña, sufficient territory for the establishment of a fishery settlement as Spain once had there. To effect the agreement in this article, the governments of His Catholic Majesty and His Moroccan Majesty shall beforehand agree, each appointing commissions to designate the land and limits of the said settlement.”

In 1861 a first expedition to pinpoint the old enclave failed, leaving the location ambiguous. In 1878, a second expedition identified Uad Ifni bay as the site of the old factory; though evidence was scant, this conclusion was preferred over Pelayo Alcalá Galiano’s proposal, which pointed instead to Uad Chebeica (Puerto Cansado).

In 1883, the National Geographic Congress called urgently for occupation of Ifni to establish a permanent colony—but subsequent expeditions were repeatedly thwarted by Morocco or hampered by French fears over trade with Morocco. After World War I, under the Treaty of Versailles, Spain held the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, the Chafarinas Isles, Peñón de Alhucemas, Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, Ifni (unoccupied), the Moroccan Protectorate, Western Sahara, and Equatorial Guinea (including Fernando Poo, Annobón, continental Guinea, and nearby islets).

The 1921 Annual Disaster marked another tragic chapter in Spanish-Moroccan relations. Bands led by Abd el‑Krim inflicted heavy losses—13,363 deaths according to the Picasso Report (likely inflated), with other sources estimating 8,000–8,500. Politically, this led to the government’s downfall and King Alfonso XIII appointing Antonio Maura to head a national unity government, which was overthrown in 1923 by General Primo de Rivera’s coup.

Abd el‑Krim declared the Rif Republic in the Spanish Protectorate—it was short-lived. In 1924, Spain’s army and navy, aided by France, conducted the first-ever amphibious air-naval landing. Peace with Morocco arrived in 1927, with Spanish victory. The Rif Republic served as an early model for later Moroccan and other Islamic liberation movements.

The French Protectorate in Morocco also faced guerrilla attacks, with some fighters taking refuge among the Ait ba Amran, a tribe originally based in Ifni. For this reason, France was eager for Spain to effectively occupy Ifni, hoping Spain would contain the rebel bands.

Colonel Capaz led the occupation with Ait ba Amran cooperation—thanks in part to bribes and gifts to tribal chiefs. The occupation followed a rectangular boundary defined by prior agreements with France, which wanted control over Saharan phosphate deposits. A specialist in African affairs, Colonel Capaz founded the Office of Indigenous Affairs and respected local laws to avoid alienating the locals.

Upon the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, he traveled to Madrid, where Republican militiamen captured and executed him. When the military uprising occurred in 1936, most of Ifni’s population sided with Franco. The Grupo de Tiradores de Ifni, composed of 8,000 men, played an active role in the conflict, suffering around 1,100 casualties.

In the wake of the devastating Civil War, governance over Ifni was murky. But on 20 July 1946, a Royal Decree established a Government of Spanish West Africa, encompassing Ifni and the Sahara. It was overseen by the Presidency of the Government via the Directorate‑General of Morocco and Colonies, headed by a general—or army, navy, or air force officer.

In 1950, Franco visited Sidi Ifni and was greeted at the airfield by prominent Ait ba Amran leaders amid pomp and ceremony. However, Morocco soon staked its claim to the territory, especially after gaining independence in 1956. Mohammed V’s return from exile in Madagascar sparked jubilation—heightening tensions in Ifni. Incidents turned deadly, with protests and demonstrations ensuing.

The Moroccan monarch encountered a Liberation Army and an Istiqlal Party both posing as powerful and difficult to manage forces, united under the idea of creating a Greater Morocco. Allal El‑Fassi, the architect of the “Great Morocco” concept, envisioned an empire including Spanish-held territories—Western Sahara, Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal.

The Moroccan monarchy aimed to channel the Liberation Army’s energy outward, not inward, fostering internal strife. Thus, it was convenient to encourage the armed groups to fight in the south. Spain permitted the Liberation Army to enter its territory, believing they were heading south to attack French interests in Mauritania. However, these armed bands had different intentions: they decided that the territory of Ifni would be a likely objective in their quest to conquer the Greater Morocco.

THE TERRITORY OF IFNI

As of the 2009 Moroccan State Territorial Reform Plan, the region of Ifni has been elevated to the status of a province.

In 1957, the territory of Ifni covered an area of 1,500 square kilometers, with just over 80 kilometers of Atlantic coastline. Administratively, it was divided into three zones: the North, with its capital at Tiugsa; the Center, with Sidi Ifni as the capital; and the South, with Telata as its main town.

The region lies between the foothills of the Anti-Atlas mountains—which reach elevations of up to 1,000 meters—and the Atlantic Ocean. This gives the territory its distinctive topography: rugged, sharply contoured, and uneven. The coastal zone enjoys a microclimate that is milder than the interior, largely thanks to the trade winds, the cold Canary Current, and the frequent sea mist, fog, and haze that form especially around the coastal strip and the capital, Sidi Ifni.

Agriculture in the region is of limited importance due to the arid and rocky terrain. Livestock farming, on the other hand—particularly of goats and sheep—plays a more significant role in the local economy. However, it is fishing that constitutes the true economic engine of the area, thanks to the region’s rich fishing grounds. That said, the Atlantic waters off Ifni are far from calm: strong currents and frequent swells make fishing operations more difficult and hazardous.

Land transportation is also problematic, hindered by the irregular terrain and lack of developed infrastructure.

In 1958, the population of Ifni stood at approximately 51,500 inhabitants, with Sidi Ifni being the most populous center, home to around 20,000 people. Of the total population, around 46,900 were indigenous, while 4,600 were of European origin.

The original inhabitants of the region are the Guezula, settled there since the 15th century, and considered part of the so-called "false Berbers"—so named because they do not trace their lineage to Cam (Ham), son of Noah, unlike the so-called "true Berbers." General Mariano Fernández Aceytuno (2001) notes that the term "Berber" shares its etymological root with "barbarian" and refers to peoples spread throughout the southern Mediterranean.

The Guezula belong to the larger confederation of the Ait Ba-Amran, a group of tribal communities that speak Tassuit, a dialect of notable purity derived from Chelha (or Tashelhit, a variety of Berber).

The Spanish presence in the region introduced several changes to local life. One notable shift was the increased use of Hassaniya, a dialect closely related to the Arabic spoken in northern Morocco.

There were also changes in local governance, although decisions made by the Yemaa (a council or assembly of elders and notable figures) were largely respected—albeit always subordinate to the Spanish authorities, especially in judicial matters.

The concept of property ownership also underwent a transformation following the Spanish settlement. Whereas previously communal ownership had prevailed, Spanish rule introduced the notion of private property as a dominant model.

The capital of the entire territory was Sidi Ifni, with a population of about 20,000 inhabitants. There, traditional local architecture coexisted with modern European styles. At its peak, the city boasted a hospital, a secondary school, several primary schools, a museum, a cinema, and even a zoo. A weekly newspaper was also published locally.

THE CONFLICT

Background:

The history of Morocco and Spain is far from one of peaceful coexistence. As early as the Arab conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in 711, we can trace a long sequence of conquests and reconquests, making the two kingdoms uneasy neighbors even before their formal establishment as modern nations.

By the time the Ifni War broke out in 1957, the local population still held vivid memories of the Rif Wars of the 1920s and their bloody aftermath. This collective memory may well explain why the Franco regime attempted to conceal the events unfolding in Morocco, launching a propaganda and censorship campaign to manipulate public opinion and suppress dissent.

Even today, relations between the two countries are not as smooth as might be hoped. A recent example is the occupation of the islet of Perejil, a Spanish sovereign territory, on July 17, 2002, by seven Moroccan gendarmes and a commanding officer. Although the Spanish Army quickly expelled the intruders, the incident nearly escalated into a larger international conflict.

Spain’s relations with Morocco improved after the Spanish Civil War, largely due to Franco's diplomatic efforts. Following World War II, the victorious Western powers turned their backs on Franco’s dictatorship, prompting him to seek alternative alliances in Latin America and the Arab world. This context partly explains why the initial uprisings against colonial powers in Morocco were directed against France rather than Spain.

From 1951, General García Valiño served as Spain’s High Commissioner in Morocco and pursued a policy of support for Moroccan insurgents—albeit mostly as an anti-French measure rather than from genuine sympathy for Moroccan nationalism. When France exiled Sultan Mohammed V to Madagascar in 1953, García Valiño continued to recognize the Sultan’s legitimacy and even offered refuge in Spanish-controlled areas to rebel groups targeting French interests.

Contrary to expectations, France gave in to pressure in 1956 and recognized Morocco's independence. With that, Moroccan nationalism turned its attention toward Spain, which now faced resistance from a movement it had previously encouraged. Ultimately, Spain had little choice but to follow France’s lead and also granted independence to its Moroccan protectorate in 1956.

Some Africanist generals in the Spanish military viewed this move as a betrayal and a disgrace.

The treaty between Spain and Morocco that formalized the end of the protectorate did not include Ceuta and Melilla, nor did it mention Ifni. However, Morocco was not satisfied with this partial independence. Through the Istiqlal Party (which means "Independence"), it began pressing claims on all remaining Spanish-held territories. The armed wing of Istiqlal, known as the Army of Liberation, became the vanguard fighting to recover these lands.

The dream of a “Greater Morocco” fueled the ambitions of the Istiqlal leadership, particularly its head, Al-Lal al-Fassi. This vision of a virtual Greater Morocco encompassed a territory far larger than what Morocco occupies today.

VISIÓN DEL GRAN MARRUECOS

Las abundantes materias primas (carbón, cobre, plomo, petróleo, gas, etc.) de este extenso territorio parecen ser la motivación esencial para la formación de este Gran Marruecos. La monarquía marroquí hizo suya esta aspiración y jugó a dos bandas permitiendo, alentando y en ocasiones colaborando con un Ejército de Liberación que no formaba parte de las Fuerzas Reales, y que cuando le convenía mostrar una imagen internacional limpia, criticaba y decía que escapaba a su control.

En 1954 España impuso un nuevo orden fiscal en los territorios de Marruecos en los que se gravaban productos básicos como el té y el azúcar. Además, se obligaba a los nativos a obtener (y pagar) un documento de identidad. Los nativos de esos territorios siempre habían mantenido una relación correcta con España, sin embargo la nueva política fiscal era algo que les resultaba ajeno e incluso algunos de los militares (muchos de ellos nativos también) se negaron al cobro de tales impuestos. La situación se volvió muy tensa y ante la previsión de un levantamiento popular, el nuevo Gobernador del África Occidental Española, Pardo de Santayana, intercedió ante Madrid para que se reconsiderasen dichas medidas. Sus argumentos fueron escuchados y se dio marcha atrás. Sin embargo el daño ya estaba hecho y las relaciones con los nativos pasaron de ser amistosas a tensas. La situación en Sidi Ifni fue más preocupante y una gran parte de la población reaccionó cerrando los negocios de la capital. Se produjeron atentados que cobraron la vida de miembros de la policía y de las Fuerzas Armadas Españolas. En Sidi Ifni había un grupo reducido, pero muy activo, de colaboradores del Istiqlal que había luchado contra Francia y que había sido acogido por España en sus territorios del Sahara. Fueron ellos los que fomentaron una conciencia nacionalista dentro del territorio saharaui. 

En julio de 1956, Ben Hammu, un importante dirigente del Ejército de Liberación y el Delegado Gubernativo Álvarez Chas se reúnen con el propósito de acordar un posible paso del Ejército de Liberación por territorio español con el objetivo de atacar las posiciones francesas en Mauritania. Chas consulta la decisión con Madrid y desde allí no hay una respuesta oficial clara ya que se desentienden del tema por considerar que no es conveniente enfurecer al Ejército de Liberación dadas las consecuencias que eso pudiera tener. La imprudencia era evidente pues el territorio español no estaba lo suficientemente bien dotado militarmente ni en lo referente a unidades ni a equipamiento. Las condiciones que se le pidieron al Ejército de Liberación fueron que cruzasen el territorio en pequeños grupos, que no se estacionaran y que no hicieran propaganda. 

El territorio del Sahara quedó cubierto de grupos armados del Ejército de Liberación cuya idea original era la de atacar posiciones francesas desde el territorio español, pero que al no obtener el apoyo de las guarniciones saharauis decidieron marchar contra España.

Resulta paradójica la negativa española a una generosa oferta de colaboración con Francia para eliminar a las bandas del Ejército de Liberación del territorio saharaui, pero es que el recelo contra los franceses resultaba superior al de los marroquíes. 

El 21 de marzo de 1957, Carrero Blanco, en una carta enviada al Gobernador del Africa Occidental Española declaraba lo siguiente:

“El Ejército de Liberación es un instrumento de la U.R.S.S. con el que intenta crear dificultades a los occidentales en África. Rabat no le (sic) controla pero lo ve con simpatía y espera de él la ampliación de sus territorios. Si nosotros nos oponemos al paso de estas tropas llegando a choques armados, se nos crea una situación difícil con Marruecos e incluso con nuestros indígenas que ven en el E.L. a hermanos de raza que les ofrecen la libertad. Si hacemos la vista gorda y dejamos penetrar a las partidas, la situación difícil se nos crea con Francia. Si los Franceses perdieran Mauritania nosotros no podríamos conservar el Sahara, que es tan territorio español como la provincia de Cuenca.” (Azcona et al. 1994).

La situación durante 1957 se va volviendo más y más tensa y el partido Istiqlal y el Ejército de Liberación van ganando cada vez más adeptos. 

El General Pardo de Santayana es sustituido en 1957 por el General Zamalloa, el cual elabora un informe para analizar lo que está ocurriendo y concluye que la situación en el Sahara es la más preocupante que la del Ifni. Se estima que hay más de 1.000 hombres armados y bien dirigidos con armamento de origen estadounidense, francés y español, por lo que resulta evidente que es la monarquía marroquí la que está apoyando a estos grupos. 

El General Zamalloa sugiere el envío de más unidades a la zona, más equipamiento militar y la colaboración directa con Francia; sin embargo en Madrid no están seguros de que sea una buena idea dado el resquemor que pudiera levantar entre la población espoñola una nueva guerra en territorio africano. Tampoco la idea de colaborar con Francia era del agrado del Gobierno. 

El territorio de Ifni fue reclamado por primera vez de manera explícita en la O.N.U. el 14 de octubre de 1957, en previsión de un ataque inminente del Ejército de Liberación. Marruecos, ante esta perspectiva, quiere asegurarse los derechos de un territorio que puede estar próximo a la liberación.

The War:

Due to the constant nature of the aggressions and the low intensity of the attacks, it is difficult to determine exactly when the war began. During the first half of 1957, there was a tense atmosphere, which, in the second half of the year, became pre-war until the attack on Sidi Ifni occurred in November.

On January 29, 1957, the border post of Tiliuín was cut off when fifty meters of telephone cable were severed. On April 16, amid unrest caused by rumors that tribal caïds had met with the sultan in Rabat, communications were once again cut at this post. The same thing happened again on April 27.

On May 6, an indigenous second lieutenant was shot dead. The following day, a sergeant was killed, and two days after that, a policeman. The objective of the Liberation Army with these attacks was to coerce natives into deserting and abandoning Spanish authority.

In such a hostile environment, the General Governor ordered reinforcements at the customs posts of Tiliuín, Tamucha, Bifurma, and Tabelcut. That same day, as a form of protest, shops in Sidi Ifni closed at the request of the Liberation Army. The perpetrators were punished by being sent to Fuerteventura, but a sense of threat loomed over the Spanish territory, and many feared an imminent invasion.

Franco’s regime, seeing the seriousness of the events in its African colonies, designed the so-called Madrid Plan, consisting of three phases: an intense diplomatic effort to pressure the Moroccan government to restrain the Liberation Army and avoid armed conflict; a direct threat to the armed bands with an ultimatum; and, finally, a military operation if neither diplomacy nor threats worked.

The Spanish West African authorities were on high alert and unwilling to tolerate further attacks from the armed bands. So, when on June 12, Captain Mohamed ben Lahsen Susi, known as Captain Musa of the nomadic police, was assassinated in the outskirts of Sidi Ifni, it can be said that the war had, in effect, begun.

In August, Morocco began petitioning official bodies for the territory of Ifni and, on November 10, even created the Directorate of Saharan and Border Affairs, a direct provocation that was later seen as a green light for the attempted invasion of the capital days later.

The reinforcements requested by the authorities of Spanish West Africa were dispatched during this time, though with hesitation from Madrid, which did not want a new confrontation with Morocco, nor for the public to learn of what was occurring in the African territories under Spanish control. It was believed the attack would primarily target the Sahara, which is why the 2nd Legion Flag was sent to Villa Bens, and the 6th to El Aaiún. Villa Cisneros also received a battalion from Cabrerizas and signal and sapper units. Altogether, there were around 4,650 men in the Sahara and another 600 native troops.

However, the Spanish military presence was not particularly robust: many of the vehicles and weapons were in poor condition, and the soldiers were underprepared and underequipped. The civil war was still too recent for the army to have properly recovered.

Although an imminent attack on Spanish Sahara positions was expected, Captain Rosaleny was surprised when one of the natives under his command informed him that at 06:30 on November 23, armed bands from the Liberation Army would attack Sidi Ifni, aiming to blow up the capital’s munitions depot and assassinate officers in their homes. Thanks to this warning, the troops were prepared—otherwise, the outcome might have been very different.

The attack on Ifni was carried out by about 1,500 men armed with submachine guns, rifles, machine guns, and mortars. They clashed with two Regulares companies, a paratrooper flag, an artillery group, a police unit, and other minor service units.

Many scattered posts across the territory were undefended and unable to resist. Eight fell into the hands of the Liberation Army, leaving numerous dead and missing. The remaining posts held out, but with great difficulty.

The assault on Sidi Ifni, led by around 200 men, was less successful, as the Spanish troops were prepared. Only one Spanish casualty was recorded, while the enemy suffered heavy losses and eventually retreated.

The Telata post was under serious siege by armed bands, prompting the decision to liberate the area. General Ortiz de Zárate was tasked with the mission. It was a dangerous operation, involving numerous roadblocks and severed communications. However, only a few kilometers from their target, they were ambushed, resulting in the death of the general and 18 more soldiers, and the mission's failure.

The situation was dire for the Spaniards in Ifni, prompting a rapid response involving air and naval forces. The Spanish authorities ordered bombing and strafing of enemy positions, though the aircraft used—old Heinkel-111s, German planes from WWII—were ill-suited for the task. Ammunition was scarce, and sometimes homemade bombs made from gasoline drums and grenades were used.

Parallel to the military conflict was an informational and propaganda war between Spain and Morocco. On November 29, Spanish National Radio broadcast:

“In response to statements made yesterday in Rabat by the Crown Prince of Morocco, accusing the Spanish of attacking Moroccan territories, official sources in Madrid assert that it is absolutely false that Spanish ground or air forces have taken any action against Moroccan territory. On the contrary, it is affirmed that the actions of the Spanish planes and troops were limited to armed groups within the Spanish territory of Ifni who harassed and attacked garrison forces. This morning's newspapers also highlight that much of the foreign press acknowledges that Spain had no interest in provoking these incidents, as it would gain no advantage. What seems most likely—concludes the Daily Telegraph—is that Ifni represents a visible sign of Morocco's internal difficulties since independence.” (Pérez García, G. 2004)

Meanwhile, Radio España Independiente, aligned with the independence cause, released a very different statement:

“In the Ifni zone, fighting is taking place between Spanish troops, supported by the air force, and the Moroccan Liberation Army. The note fabricated by the Ministry of the Army says blood is flowing in Ifni and that some villages are being bombed. In the Canaries, three Spanish ministers are directing operations. The Moroccan government has offered to negotiate peacefully, but Franco has responded by intensifying military operations. His political spokesmen are responsible for the events in Ifni, a territory that belongs to Morocco and must be handed over without delay. Spanish troops must be urgently repatriated. No men or weapons should leave Spain to fight the Moroccan people.” (Pérez García, Guadalupe, 2004)

Spain decided to reinforce its military presence, sending new troops: infantry battalions from the Canary Islands, two Legion Flags, paratrooper units from the mainland, bomber and reconnaissance squadrons, and naval units.

The goal was to secure the positions still under control, especially the capital, and then launch counter-offensives to recover lost positions.

To liberate the Tiliuín post, where about 60 men were located, Operation Handkerchief was planned. It marked the first combat parachute jump in Spanish military history. The 6th Legion Flag also participated. Once the post was secured, it was decided to destroy the fort and return all troops to Sidi Ifni.

Aiming to clear all besieged territories, Operation Netol (named after a popular cleaning product at the time) was launched. It was a difficult operation because, although expelling the armed bands was relatively easy, they would quickly return once the Spaniards left. This guerrilla tactic severely hampered the Spanish army, which was not fighting a regular army but a more elusive and diffuse enemy—compounded by earlier mentioned logistical and material shortages. This operation specifically required fast-moving transport, which was impossible due to the outdated vehicles.

Operation Gento, named after the famous Real Madrid left winger, was carried out in December 1957, aiming to liberate Tigsa and Tenín, located on the left side of the Ifni territory. However, the same problems arose: lack of military and transport resources. After an assault that caused numerous casualties, the troops retreated but later recaptured Tenín.

The first part of the army’s mission was considered concluded in December, although the public was not well informed, and media portrayed it as a total victory over the Liberation Army. Up to that point, 62 Spaniards had died and 125 were wounded, including officers and soldiers. During that year’s Christmas season, Carmen Sevilla and Miguel Gila visited Sidi Ifni to boost troop morale and give a sense of normalcy.

Though Madrid did not directly accuse the Moroccan sultan of supporting the Liberation Army, tense moments occurred as Royal forces moved near the Spanish border. In a show of strength, Spain sent two cruisers (“Canarias” and “Méndez Núñez”) and four destroyers to Agadir, a city close to the northern border of Spanish-controlled territory. With their cannons pointed at the city, the message was clear, and it worked—there was no direct involvement from royal troops.

International organizations—particularly the United Nations—were increasingly pressuring Spain to provide information on its non-autonomous territories. To relieve this pressure, in January 1958, Franco granted both Ifni and the Sahara the status of full Spanish provinces, following the example of Portuguese Salazar’s African colonies. A General Governor was appointed to each, and Sidi Ifni and El Aaiún were designated as their capitals, militarily subordinate to the Captain General of the Canary Islands.

On January 12, a Spanish garrison in El Aaiún was attacked. Though the Liberation Army was defeated and forced to retreat, the next day, two companies of the XIII Legion Flag were ambushed in Edchera, leading to a bloody battle. Spain suffered 48 deaths and 64 wounded.

Operation Diana aimed to occupy forward resistance positions in the East and Southeast zones. It was another difficult mission, costing 14 lives and 69 wounded.

On February 10, Operation Sirocco was launched as a diversion, making the enemy unsure whether to retreat to the Sahara or Ifni. Several enemy trucks were destroyed in air raids over Zoco el Arbaa.

In Operation Pegasus, on February 19, with air and naval support, Spanish forces temporarily took Ercunt following a parachute drop, but later withdrew to their original positions. Spain suffered 7 deaths and 15 wounded, but the operation succeeded in limiting the enemy to defensive positions, reducing their capacity for harassment.

Faced with ongoing pressure, Spain and France held a conference on January 14 in Las Palmas and agreed that France would support Spain militarily in the Sahara (though not in Ifni). This led to successful joint operations—“Teide” and “Ecovillon”—to clear guerrillas from Spanish-held areas. France contributed 6,000 troops, about 70 aircraft and light armored vehicles, one transport ship, and six landing craft. Thanks to this support, Spain achieved total victory in the Sahara, which would have been unlikely with its outdated, insufficient equipment (lacking even basic supplies like ammunition, parachutes, or canteens).

Both Morocco and Spain were U.S. allies, so the United States was interested in a diplomatic resolution. Thus, on April 10, 1958, at the Cintra Conference, Spain agreed to hand over the southern zone of the Protectorate—Tarfaya region—to Morocco.

There were incidents during the transfer ceremony in Villa Bens. Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, with Royal Armed Forces, wanted to cross part of the Sahara, but Spain denied it and closed the borders. Eventually, an internal route was found, avoiding major conflict. Since April 17, the Moroccan flag has flown there.

In contrast, skirmishes continued in Ifni, with fatalities reported until May.

On June 23, 1958, General Zamalloa received a telegram:

“Representative of the armed bands assures that from 12:00 on the 30th, a ceasefire will begin in this sector. Carefully observe enemy behavior, exercise extreme caution. Our fire is completely prohibited. Aviation must not fly.”

The war was over.

Consequences:

In total, the number of casualties reached 198 dead, 574 wounded, and 78 missing (Segura Valero, 2006), including the fronts in Ifni and the Sahara.The Liberation Army had reached the limit of its resistance and was forced to accept a ceasefire, which was interpreted in Spain as a clear victory. The media enthusiastically echoed the news. Notably, the decisive collaboration of the French army in the final victory was not mentioned and it was presented as a solo success of the Spanish army.

However, the Moroccan Liberation Army had achieved part of its objectives, as the region of Tarfaya was retaken and in Ifni only the capital, Sidi Ifni, remained, reduced to a defensive perimeter of about 5 km. As a result, the city’s defense was reinforced with mines, sharpshooters, and defensive outposts. Some isolated skirmishes were carried out by uncontrollable elements, but overall peace gradually settled in the area and the city began to enjoy a moment of splendor as a Spanish province, thanks to the investment made from Spain in public works.

Rehabilitation projects for the city began in 1958 and a port was built (initially planned for 1954) due to the lack of coastal protection in case of attack, which had indeed occurred.Between 1958 and 1967, subsidies amounting to 470 million pesetas were received, representing 76.4% of the total investment of 615.9 million pesetas.

Before the final return of the capital to Morocco, there were 11,622 Spaniards and 5,600 natives in Sidi Ifni. Of these, 7,500 were soldiers, 945 were active-duty military or administrative personnel, 111 were civil servants, plus 738 family members of military and government workers, 11 religious figures, and 183 families in other professions (Hernando de Larramendi, 1997).Industry never truly took off in the area, due to a lack of private investment, the remoteness of the colony, and difficult communications. The only notable factories were an ice factory and a soda plant. Agriculture remained subsistence-based.

It was clear that maintaining the Ifni colony was not particularly profitable, and the Francoist government considered using the return of Sidi Ifni as a bargaining chip.In a calm climate following the 1957–58 conflict, the leaders of both governments began negotiating a possible return of the remaining Ifni territory and even some of the islets under Spanish sovereignty off the northern Moroccan coast, claimed by Morocco. In exchange, Morocco would withdraw its claim to Ceuta and Melilla and the Sahara territory. Spain was very interested in maintaining control of the Saharan territory because phosphate deposits had recently been discovered there.

In 1963, at a meeting in Barajas between Franco and Hassan II, both agreed to start negotiations over the return of Ifni. Meetings followed, and in 1967 Moroccan Foreign Minister M. Laraki announced at the U.N. General Assembly that a preliminary agreement with Spain existed.In 1968, the Spanish ambassador, Mr. Piriés, also declared at the General Assembly that Spain accepted the plan proposed by Morocco to make the return of Ifni effective. Thus, on January 4, 1969, the Fez Agreements were signed, through which Spain ceded sovereignty of Ifni to Morocco, renouncing the terms of the 1860 Treaty of Tetuan, which had recognized Spain’s right to a fishing outpost on the African coast, as had been the case centuries earlier with Santa Cruz del Mar Pequeña. However, Spain sought to ensure that its right to fish in Moroccan waters would be respected, and the agreement was to be renewed every ten years. Nevertheless, three years after Ifni's return, Morocco unilaterally revoked Spain’s right to fish in its waters, which sparked—and continues to spark—numerous diplomatic conflicts between the two countries.

On April 22, the Spanish Cortes approved the transfer, and on June 30, 1969, the Moroccan flag was raised in Sidi Ifni, replacing the Spanish one. Prior to this, the city had been evacuated of Spanish military and administrative personnel, and even the dead were exhumed and moved to the Canary Islands.

Ironically, the supposed return of the territory was not a “return” in the strict sense, as this territory had never actually belonged to the Moroccan kingdom.This measure was believed to put an end to Morocco’s territorial claims and to gain favor with the Arab countries in the U.N. in hopes they would support Spain’s claims over Gibraltar, which was the main focus of Spanish diplomacy at the time.

However, Morocco was not satisfied with just the return of Ifni and extended its claims to the Sahara. In 1969, a report by the BBC’s Arabic service suggested that negotiations were underway between Spain and Morocco for the cession of the Sahara territory to Morocco. This was the seed of what would become the "Organization of the Vanguard for the Liberation of Río de Oro," i.e., the Sahrawi Polisario Front.

On June 17, 1970, in El Aaiún, the Spanish governor of Western Sahara called a demonstration in favor of maintaining the territorial status quo. Simultaneously, the nascent Polisario Front had organized a protest demanding the right to independence. Spanish authorities violently dispersed the demonstration and opened fire, causing several deaths. In addition, the leader of the independence movement, Sidi Brahim Bassiri, disappeared and his whereabouts remain unknown to this day. On May 10, the Polisario Front carried out its first armed action and continued attacks against Spanish positions until 1975.

The Spanish government was divided between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which favored granting Sahrawi independence in line with U.N. demands, and the presidency, which supported handing the territory over to Morocco.After the assassination of Carrero Blanco in 1973, Spanish policy regarding the Sahara changed, and an autonomy statute for the Saharan territory was drafted. However, pressure from Morocco, which aspired to control the region, prevented the statute from being implemented.

Since 1966, the United Nations had been calling for a self-determination referendum for Western Sahara. In 1974, following another shift in Spanish policy, Spain finally agreed to hold the referendum.Morocco attempted to block the referendum diplomatically and even proposed to Mauritania a partition of the territory. The case was referred to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which ultimately ruled that the ties between the Saharan territory and Morocco were insufficient to support Morocco’s claims (only some tribal ties of nomadic groups existed). Therefore, the Sahrawi people were free to decide their future.

Hassan II, convinced that the Sahara should belong to Morocco, organized a civilian march of around 350,000 people from across Morocco, financed with Arab funds. This became known as the Green March.On November 10, 1975, Spain withdrew from the Sahara and handed the territory over to Morocco. The Moroccan option was preferred due to the uncertainty surrounding the creation of a new Sahrawi state supported by Algeria and Libya, which could be perceived as a threat to the Canary Islands.

The Green March entered the Sahara on November 6 and withdrew three days later. Armed clashes between the Polisario Front and Morocco then began.Faced with the Moroccan invasion, the population fled to refugee camps in the desert, which were bombed by Morocco in 1976, causing numerous casualties. The survivors fled to Algerian territory, where they received direct support in their struggle for independence.

A long conflict against the Moroccan occupier began and dragged on for years. In 1991, a ceasefire was declared, and the so-called “Moroccan walls” were built, dividing the territory conquered by Morocco from that controlled by the Polisario Front. Morocco retained the productive western zone, rich in phosphate mines and with an important fishing area, while the Sahrawis were confined to a much less productive area. Eight walls totaling 2,500 km were built, defended by bunkers, landmines, and barbed wire.

The conflict remains unresolved, and all attempts to find a solution to the Sahrawi impasse have failed. Morocco’s refusal to recognize Sahrawi independence and international apathy—especially from Spain—have left the situation unresolved and a population suffering the consequences of living in refugee camps for more than 30 years.

As for the territory of Ifni, in recent years there have been uprisings and protests due to public discontent. The fish unloading company at the port of Sidi Ifni had been hiring only people from outside the city, which sparked protests by the unemployed, who blocked the road and prevented trucks from entering or leaving the city.Youth unemployment exceeds 50%, and for years the former Spanish colony has been organizing protests over what it sees as neglect by Moroccan authorities and a lack of interest in the region’s development. However, the protest on June 7, 2008, was violently repressed. According to Moroccan authorities, 3,000 police officers were deployed to quell the unrest, although some residents claim the number was much higher. There are also discrepancies regarding the number of casualties. The Arab channel Al Jazeera reported two deaths, while Morocco denied this. What is certain is that there were many injuries and reports of police brutality, looting, rape, and targeting of citizens with residence in Spain.

In Morocco’s Territorial Reform Plan, approved in November 2008, King Mohamed VI proposed, in his words, “advanced and gradual regionalization,” beginning with the territory of the Sahara and including Ifni, representing a major shift in the administration of these regions. However, many of the problems affecting these former Spanish colonies remain unresolved.

CONCLUSION:

As Fernández Aceytuno (2001) affirms, there has been no territory more disputed in Spanish history—except for Gibraltar—than that of Ifni. And yet, unlike Gibraltar, the historical events surrounding the former Spanish colony are almost entirely unknown to the general public.

The oblivion into which the Ifni territory has fallen is no coincidence. For several centuries, those lands were neglected to such an extent that, when Spain attempted to reclaim them in the 19th century, the exact location of the territory known as Santa Cruz del Mar Pequeña was no longer even clear. This led to reconnaissance expeditions that only heightened tensions with Morocco. Today, we know that the territory of Ifni did not coincide with the old Spanish possession, which was actually located in Puerto Cansado. Moreover, the Franco regime deliberately maintained secrecy regarding the functioning of the colony—especially as the situation grew tense.

For many Spaniards, the word "Africa" did not conjure romantic or exotic images, but rather the suffering endured during the Rif Wars. The historical development of that piece of land on the Barbary coast, which once served as a refuge for fishermen working those waters, still fails to attract much interest, and there is limited bibliography on the subject. The same applies to the Ifni War, even though more recently the conflict has been studied in greater depth. Still, it remains the last armed conflict in which Spain actively participated. It is also true that many of the historians who have documented this war are military personnel, who naturally have a particular interest in the events of that time. To get an idea of how overlooked this conflict was, one need only consider the names it has been given: la guerra chica (the little war), la guerra silenciada (the silenced war), or la guerra que nunca existió (the war that never happened).

The Ifni War is an uncomfortable chapter in Spain’s history. The enemy was defeated, but ultimately Morocco achieved its goals, and Spain gradually withdrew from all of its former possessions. The main beneficiary was the Sultan of Morocco, who annexed territories that had never historically belonged to the Moroccan kingdom—sparking further conflicts, such as the still unresolved Western Sahara dispute.

It is also important to highlight the crucial role played by the French army in achieving the final victory. Their military support—especially in terms of air and land transport—combined with Spanish forces, led to the surrender of the Liberation Army’s armed groups. Nonetheless, neither Spain nor France had an interest in publicizing this collaboration, partly to avoid offending their respective allies.

Another frequently recalled aspect by those who fought in the war was the lack of adequate equipment for combat in such an environment, as well as the poor condition of the Spanish weaponry.

Following the war, there was a period of calm and prosperity in Sidi Ifni that many of its former inhabitants remember with nostalgia. Today, forgotten by both sides, it remains stuck in limbo—flanked by the ocean on one side and the desert on the other.